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I.

INTRODUCTION

This article reports on two cases decided by the Minnesota
Supreme Court during its 2003-04 term. The first is a major
insurance coverage “trigger-and-allocation” case; the second is a tax
case with implications for insurance coverage of electronic
property.
In 2003, the supreme court decided In re Silicone Implant

† Robert P. Thavis is a 1980 honors graduate of Yale Law School. Since
graduation he has practiced at the Minneapolis office of Leonard, Street and
Deinard, where he is a shareholder and the founder of the firm’s insurance
coverage practice group, which focuses on the representation of corporate
policyholders in coverage disputes. Mr. Thavis is a frequent author and lecturer at
local and national seminars on topics of insurance coverage law.
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1

Insurance Coverage Litigation (“In re Silicone”), a decision which
clarified the effect of prior rulings in two areas. First and most
significantly, the court re-addressed the trilogy of “allocation”
decisions authored by then-Chief Justice Keith during the mid2
1990s. Second, the supreme court declined an opportunity to
expand the circumstances in which a policyholder successful in a
coverage action may collect attorney fees incurred in that coverage
3
action.
In the 2004 tax case Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Commissioner of
4
Revenue, the supreme court clarified some, and modified other,
prior rulings as to whether electronic data constitutes “tangible
5
personal property” under Minnesota sales tax statutes. The Sprint
Spectrum court concluded that electronic telephone transmissions
constituted “tangible personal property,” adding to Minnesota’s
body of case law supporting coverage for damage or loss to
6
computer and other electronic data and programs.
II. TRIGGER AND ALLOCATION
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in In re Silicone arose
out of coverage litigation between 3M and a number of its
7
insurers. 3M sought coverage, in relevant part, for sums paid to
settle lawsuits brought against it by women who claimed to have
been injured by the implantation of silicone-filled breast implants
8
manufactured by 3M or its predecessors-in-interest. The supreme
court used In re Silicone to clarify the “trigger and allocation” rules it
adopted and applied in a series of earlier decisions that determined
coverage under consecutively issued comprehensive general
9
liability (“CGL”) policies.
The “trigger” concept addresses what sort of event activates, or
triggers, the insurer’s coverage obligation under any single CGL
10
policy.
The issue of “allocation,” in turn, relates to the
methodology used to prioritize coverage obligations when more
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

667 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2003).
Id. at 417-22.
Id. at 422-25.
676 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 665.
In re Silicone, 667 N.W.2d at 408.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 413-22.
Id. at 414.
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then one CGL coverage period has been “triggered” by an insured
11
event, or series of insured events, resulting in one loss. Thus,
“trigger and allocation” might be viewed as the Abbott and Costello
of the coverage world: just as Lou Costello’s punch line needed
Bud Abbott’s straight man set-up, the punch line question of
“allocation” requires the set-up of a “trigger” determination. A
handful of different competing trigger rules and competing
allocation methodologies have been adopted by the courts of
various states.
During the 1990s the Minnesota Supreme Court decided three
cases in which it adopted and applied rules to govern the allocation
of coverage obligations between consecutively-issued CGL policies:
Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York
12
13
(“NSP”); SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. (“SCSC”); and
14
Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co. (“Domtar”).
All three
15
decisions were authored by then-Chief Justice Sandy Keith.
Although each was a clear decision, the three proved difficult to
integrate into a cohesive rule, with the result that the practitioner
was sometimes left wondering “Who’s on first?” With benefit of
hindsight, it becomes clear that the primary reason for the
confusion was that the decisions clearly enunciated Minnesota’s
allocation rule, but did not adequately address the difficulties of
applying the state’s trigger rule.
A. Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York
In NSP, the first of Minnesota’s allocation cases, NSP sought
coverage, under policies with no pollution exclusion, for damages
and clean-up costs resulting from long-term environmental
16
contamination. NSP’s coverage dispute raised questions of both
17
trigger and allocation. The NSP court first noted four competing
approaches to the trigger question, but engaged in no debate
among them, declaring that Minnesota’s rule was already settled:
11. See, e.g., N. States Power Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657,
662 (Minn. 1994).
12. 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
13. 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995).
14. 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997).
15. Domtar, Inc., 563 N.W.2d at 728; SCSC Corp., 536 N.W.2d at 308; N. States
Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 658.
16. N. States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 659.
17. Id. at 659-60.
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[C]ourts tend to follow one of four “trigger” theories to
determine which policies were “on the risk:”
the
“exposure” rule, whereby only those policies in effect
when the claimant or property was exposed to hazardous
materials are triggered; the “manifestation” rule, whereby
only those policies in effect when the injury or damage
was discovered are triggered; the “continuous trigger”
where the policies in effect at the time of exposure, the
time of manifestation, and all the time in between are
triggered; and the “actual injury” or “injury-in-fact”
trigger, whereby only those policies in effect when
damage occurred are triggered . . . . Minnesota follows the
“actual injury” or “injury-in-fact” theory to determine
which policies have been triggered by an occurrence
18
causing damages for which an insured is liable.
The NSP court then explained Minnesota’s “actual injury” rule
in (somewhat) greater detail:
The essence of the actual injury trigger theory is that each
insurer is held liable for only those damages which
occurred during its policy period; no insurer is held liable
for damages outside its policy period. Where the policy
periods do not overlap, therefore, the insurers are
19
consecutively, not concurrently liable.
With that, the NSP court promptly moved on to determine
what rule of allocation would fit best with Minnesota’s “actual
20
injury” trigger rule. The court first brushed aside the majority “all
21
sums” approach, not on the merits, but on the ground that NSP
was no longer advocating the “all sums” approach on appeal after
22
its rejection by the trial court below. Instead, the supreme court
23
noted that on appeal NSP urged a “pro rata by limits” allocation,
18. Id. at 662.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. In an “all sums” approach, all triggered policies are jointly and severally
obligated to provide coverage, and the policyholder may select which policies to
exhaust. See TOD ZUCKERMAN ET AL., 2 ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE LITIGATION: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 10:11 (2004). An insurer’s remedy to claimed overpayment, if any,
would be a contribution action against the other insurers. See N. States Power Co.,
523 N.W.2d at 660 n.4.
22. N. States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 662.
23. In a “pro rata by limits” approach, each triggered year of coverage is
assessed its “share” based on the amount, or limits, of coverage purchased in that
year. See ZUCKERMAN, supra note 21. Thus, a year in which $10 million of coverage
was purchased would make twice the indemnity payment of a year in which only $5
million in coverage was purchased.
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but the court rejected that as well, as “inconsistent with the actual
24
injury trigger theory.”
The Minnesota Court of Appeals had applied an allocation
scheme that apportioned damages “as proven; in other words, each
policy would cover only those damages that are allocable to harm
25
which occurred during the policy period.” The NSP court noted
that the “as proven” rule would be consistent with an actual injury
26
trigger. However, the supreme court further acknowledged that
the “as proven” rule, being a fact-based test, would be more likely to
foster costly litigation to determine what harm resulted in what
27
policy year and less likely to foster early settlements. The supreme
court also noted the resulting unfairness of requiring a
policyholder to shoulder the burden of proving not just a right to
coverage and the policyholder’s total damages, but also the amount
28
of its damages which occurred in each policy period. Thus, the
supreme court declared the “as proven” rule to be “unattractive
given the scientific complexity of the issues involved, the extended
period of time over which damages may have occurred before
29
discovery, and the number of parties potentially involved.”
Instead, the NSP court adopted a “pro rata by time on the risk”
30
allocation rule. The NSP court explained that its “time on the
risk” rule would provide “the same result [as the court of appeals’
‘as proven’ methodology] when, as may be the case here, the
31
damages are continuous over all policy periods.” However, the
“time on the risk” rule also had the perceived advantage of being
“attractive for its simplicity,” given that it would be less fact32
dependent in application.
That is because under the “pro rata by time on the risk” rule, a
policyholder need show only (i) that “damage began on a
particular date, X, and ended on, or was discovered at, a later date,
Y . . . and [(ii)] the total amount of damages for which coverage
33
may exist,” but need not show how much damage fell into each

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

N. States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 662.
Id.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 662-63.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 663-64.
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policy period. Rather, the trial court presumes that the damages in
a contamination case like NSP fall evenly
from the first point at which damages occurred to the
time of discovery, cleanup[,] or whenever the last
triggered policy period ended. Each triggered policy
therefore bears a share of the total damages
proportionate to the number of years it was on the risk
relative to the total number of years of coverage
34
triggered.
This presumption that “damages were continuous from the
point of the first damage to the point of discovery or clean up [sic]”
is sufficient to shift the burden to the insurer(s) to establish how
35
Absent
much damage actually occured in a given policy year.
such a showing, coverage is apportioned equally to each year of
triggered coverage.
Notwithstanding its adoption of this new rule, the NSP court
took pains not to set the rule in stone. First, the NSP decision
noted that trial courts must have leeway to apply differing
allocation rules based on the facts in each particular case:
“Damages are by nature fact dependent and the trial courts must
be given the flexibility to apportion them in a manner befitting
36
each case.” Second, the NSP court volunteered that its allocation
rule could change as insurance coverage law continued to
37
develop. These comments were viewed as clear indications that
the door was not closed to alternative arguments in future cases,
and may help explain why NSP was only the first in a series of
decisions respecting allocation.
What sometimes has been overlooked in subsequent analyses
of the NSP rule, however, were the limits imposed on that rule by
the context within which it was announced. In NSP, the entire
analysis described above began with the supreme court describing
the particular type of loss giving rise to NSP’s claim for insurance
38
coverage as an “environmental liability” claim. The NSP decision
then noted that
environmental liability insurance cases raise a variety of
issues, such as: what “trigger theory” should a court apply

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 663.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 660-61.
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to determine which policies are at issue; are the damages
excluded by various provisions in the policies, such as the
“owned property” and pollution exclusions; how should a
court determine the number of “occurrences” under the
policies; what method of allocation between successive
39
insurers is most appropriate . . . .
A few paragraphs later, the NSP court’s entire discussion of the four
competing trigger rules, which set the stage for its analysis of
allocation, began with the words “[i]n these cases,” meaning
40
“environmental liability insurance cases.”
Thus, while perhaps not initially clear, the conclusion is
inescapable when viewed in hindsight. The allocation rules
debated in NSP were being debated with respect to, and NSP’s
“time on the risk” rule was intended to apply to, only those
situations such as long-term environmental contamination
coverage cases, in which coverage from multiple CGL policy
periods was triggered. Certainly, NSP made clear that its “time on
the risk” rule was never intended to apply if only one year’s
coverage was triggered, since there would be no need to allocate at
41
all. What was missing, however, was clarity as to when Minnesota’s
“actual injury” trigger rule triggered consecutive policies, and when
it triggered only one.
B. SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.
That issue became a bit clearer the year after NSP when the
42
supreme court issued its decision in SCSC. In SCSC, the damage
was again environmental, but the insurers and SCSC disputed
whether the environmental damage was the result of one sudden
and accidental spill of contaminants in 1977, which would have
been covered, or was the result of long-term gradual
contamination, for which coverage would likely have been
excluded under the policies’ “sudden and accidental” pollution
43
exclusions. That fact question was resolved at trial, with the jury
39. Id. at 661.
40. Id. at 662.
41. Id. at 663.
42. SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995).
43. Id. at 310. The “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion, typically in
use during the period from 1973-1986, purported to exclude coverage for
pollution losses other than those resulting from a “sudden and accidental”
occurrence. Irene A. Sullivan and Timothy G. Reynolds, Hazardous Waste
Litigation: Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Coverage Issues, PRACTISING L.
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agreeing with SCSC that at least some damage stemmed from one
44
It further found that
“sudden and accidental” spill in 1977.
damage from that one spill continued for years thereafter, and that
that continuing damage from the 1977 spill was indistinguishable
from any damage that might have resulted from any gradual
45
contamination. The trial court therefore found NSP’s “time on
the risk” allocation rule inapplicable.
However, under Minnesota law, if any cause of an indivisible
loss is covered, then the entire loss is covered, absent proof by the
46
insurer that an uncovered cause was the “overriding” cause of loss.
Since the insurers in SCSC failed to establish any “overriding” cause
47
of loss at trial, SCSC was entitled to full coverage for its entire loss.
In deciding which insurers owed what portion of that coverage, the
trial court applied a “vertical exhaustion” allocation formula, in
which all coverage in place during 1977, the first year of covered
loss, would be exhausted, followed by the 1978 policies, and then
48
those from 1979, 1980, and so on.
The supreme court accepted the finding that the one event of
contamination in 1977 triggered the coverage in place in 1977, and
that since no insurer established any other “overriding” cause of
49
loss, the entire loss was covered.
The supreme court further
accepted that the contaminants spilled in 1977 continued to cause
additional damage to the environment, including by working their
50
way into the groundwater, for years thereafter. The SCSC court
therefore agreed that NSP was distinguishable as involving
continuing insurable event(s), while all of SCSC’s covered damage
51
was traceable solely to the 1977 spill. Thus, the supreme court
affirmed the trial court’s ruling that NSP’s “time on the risk” rule
52
was inapplicable.
However, the SCSC court rejected the trial court’s substitute
“vertical” allocation approach, concluding that if an insurable event
INST. 279, 331 (1997).
44. SCSC Corp., 536 N.W.2d at 310.
45. Id.
46. See Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383
N.W.2d 645, 653 (Minn. 1986); Campbell v. Ins. Serv. Agency, 424 N.W.2d 785,
789 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
47. SCSC Corp., 536 N.W.2d at 310.
48. Id. at 317.
49. Id. at 318.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 317-18.
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occurred only in 1977, then only that one year of insurance
53
covered loss from that insured event. It did not matter if damage
from that insured event continued beyond 1977, or whether
damage from post-1977 uninsured events was covered by virtue of
Minnesota’s “contributing loss” rule; any such damage did not
54
trigger any additional policies’ coverage. If the limits of that 1977
coverage were insufficient to cover the policyholder’s full covered
loss, then that loss was simply under-insured.
Thus, in NSP the supreme court had articulated a rule under
which repeated long-term insured events of environmental
contamination triggered policies during the entire period of
contamination and, absent evidence to the contrary, the injury was
presumed to be equal in each year of contamination, resulting in a
loss spread equally over the number of years of coverage during the
period of contamination. In SCSC, however, the supreme court
had articulated the flip-side of that rule: when the insurable event
was not a continuing one, then only insurance from the year of the
insurable event was triggered, regardless of whether that insurable
event resulted in covered loss or damage in later years. In short,
after SCSC, the NSP decision appeared to be limited to only those
cases in which repeated insurable events (such as gradual, longterm contamination or exposure) triggered multiple years of
coverage.
C. Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co.
Apparently believing that its rule of NSP and SCSC was less
than crystal clear, however, the supreme court sought to “clarify”
the rule of NSP and SCSC in Domtar just two years later.
Domtar, like NSP, involved long-term, gradual contamination,
and the result in Domtar was therefore the application of NSP’s rule
55
of “time on the risk” allocation.
However, the supreme court
introduced a twist unfavorable to policyholders. In Domtar, the
court determined that the period of contamination ran for sixty56
four years following the first damage.
However, because some
older policies were lost and some insurers that had issued more
recent policies (with “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusions)
53. Id. at 318.
54. Id.
55. Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 732-33 (Minn.
1997).
56. Id. at 732.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 4
THAVIS (CB & CKI & LSK).DOC

460

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

11/14/2004 4:20:27 PM

[Vol. 31:2

had settled, Domtar sought coverage for only fifteen of those sixty57
four years. Domtar argued that under NSP’s “time on the risk”
rule, its covered loss should be allocated equally among the fifteen
58
years of triggered coverage. The supreme court, however, held
that the denominator used to establish each insurer’s fractional
liability was sixty-four years, even if insurance coverage had been
59
available in only fifteen of those years. That had the effect of
60
leaving the policyholder uninsured as to 49/64ths of its loss.
More importantly for the later interpretation of the NSP/SCSC
rule, the Domtar court distinguished between NSP and SCSC not in
the abstract, but once again in the context of long-term
61
As a result, the Domtar opinion
environmental contamination.
placed a greater emphasis on the NSP decision than on SCSC.
Indeed, following almost two pages of discussion of the NSP
decision, the Domtar court dismissed SCSC in a single paragraph:
The proper scope of coverage will also depend on the
facts of the case. When environmental contamination
arises from discrete and identifiable events, then the
actual-injury trigger theory allows those policies on the
risk at the point of initial contamination to pay for all
property damage that follows. See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut.
Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 318 (Minn. 1995) (despite
continuing damage from leaching of chemicals into the
groundwater after the policy period, only the primary and
excess policies on the risk at the time of the discharge
were triggered, but those policies responded to the entire
62
loss).
Then, in a passage with implications for In re Silicone, the
Domtar court went on to describe the limits on NSP’s “time on the
risk” allocation rule: “It is only in those difficult cases in which
property damage is both continuous and so intermingled as to be

57. Id. at 731.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 732-33.
60. The Domtar court asserted that NSP was already clear on this issue and did
not acknowledge Domtar as constituting a change to the rule of NSP. Id. at 733-36.
However, the NSP decision had actually declared that “[e]ach triggered policy
therefore bears a share of the total damages proportionate to the number of years
it was on the risk relative to the total number of years of coverage triggered.” 523 N.W.2d
at 663 (emphasis added).
61. Domtar, Inc., 563 N.W.2d at 732-33.
62. Id. at 733.
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63

practically indivisible that NSP properly applies.”
The problem
with that pronouncement was that the Domtar court apparently did
not mean that NSP applied in all “cases in which property damage is .
64
. . continuous.” Rather, it meant only that NSP applied to those
cases in which continuous property damage is the result of
continuing insured events.
D. In re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation
In In re Silicone, the supreme court undertook its first postKeith analysis and application of NSP, SCSC, and Domtar. As in
these three cases, the main question presented in In re Silicone was
again one of “allocation.” However, in In re Silicone, it becomes
clear that, as in stand-up comedy, timing is everything in “trigger
and allocation,” and it is the “trigger” issue which really steals the
show.
While the trilogy of NSP, SCSC and Domtar set the stage for the
supreme court’s decision in In re Silicone, that stage also went
through numerous “set changes” in proceedings below. For while
the supreme court issued its decision in In re Silicone in 2003, the
action was first filed in 1994, prior even to the court’s decision in
65
NSP. As such, the In re Silicone trial court was required to absorb
and apply all three prior supreme court pronouncements on
allocation. Not surprisingly, this resulted in some changes in the
allocation rulings by the trial court.
Moreover, a key fact issue in In re Silicone, the identification of
the triggering event, was not only disputed but was also
complicated by the fact that both 3M and its insurers took the
66
position that silicone breast implants caused no injury. While it is
not unusual for a policyholder to settle underlying litigation
without an admission of liability, in this case one of the keys to
determining whether one, or more than one, coverage year was
triggered was whether the injury to the underlying implant
67
recipients was caused by one, or more than one, insurable event.
The trial court conducted a “medical trigger bench trial” in 1996 to
determine trigger, but ultimately found itself required to
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. In re Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 667 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn.
2003).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 410-11.
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determine whether an injury, which all of the experts agreed did
not happen, happened in the way described by 3M’s experts, or in
68
the manner described by the insurers’ experts.
The trial court’s first allocation ruling, coming after its
“medical trigger bench trial,” was issued in July 1996, after the
69
supreme court’s ruling in SCSC but before Domtar. Based on the
medical expert testimony, the trial court determined that for
purposes of the case, “[a]ctual-injury” occurred at or shortly after
time of implantation, and that “[c]overage is triggered
continuously for all policies in effect at the time of implant, at the
time of manifestation of systemic disease symptoms, and at all times
70
in between those events.” Thus, the trial court found the NSP
allocation rule applicable. That ruling was then clarified by an
order changing “the end date of damages from ‘the time of
manifestation of systemic disease symptoms’ to ‘the earlier of the
implant recipient’s death, or the date on which the recipient files a
71
lawsuit for damages.’”
However, the district court sua sponte vacated its July 1997
72
decision in light of Domtar.
At that point, the district court
reasoned that the continuously occurring injuries were all the
consequence of one discrete occurrence (the implantation), and
that under Domtar, where “a single, discrete occurrence can be
73
identified, the continuous trigger has no applicability.”
In 1997, the district court, upon full briefing by the parties,
74
reinstated its original 1996 ruling by applying the NSP rule. This
determination was based upon the trial court’s conclusion that “the
injury at issue is not one injury with continuous leakage, but a
consistently recurring injury that takes place each time silicone
75
comes in contact with new cells, creating a new bioreaction.” In
other words, the trial court concluded that “injury” began at or
near the time of implantation, and both injury and damage
continued thereafter.
In reviewing the district court’s allocation decision, the
supreme court concluded that in finding that this “recurring
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 411.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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76

injury” triggered coverage in multiple policy periods, the district
court “appears to have equated a ‘continuous trigger’ with a
77
‘continuous injury,’ which is inaccurate.” Instead, the supreme
court concluded that “injury” was the result of an insurable event,
not the insurable event itself, and thus injury in multiple years was
78
irrelevant to trigger. After affirming the district court’s finding
that the insurable event occurred shortly after the time of
implantation, the supreme court then concluded that under the
“actual injury” trigger rule, “the policies were triggered at or about
79
the time of implantation.” Hence, for each implant recipient’s
claim, only one policy owed coverage.
The In re Silicone court then concluded that the trial court’s
incorrect conclusion that an implantation triggered multiple
policies had resulted in the trial court incorrectly applying a “time
80
on the risk” allocation.
In addressing this aspect of the trial
court’s conclusion, the In re Silicone court once again analyzed NSP,
SCSC, and Domtar at some length, but this time with a somewhat
81
different emphasis than in Domtar.
The supreme court
concluded:
Domtar established guidelines for allocating losses from a
continuing injury, like the immune diseases at issue here,
using an injury-in-fact approach. The first, and most
obvious, is that only insurance policies that are
appropriately “triggered” are on the risk. Therefore,
before an allocation discussion can occur, the district
court needs to identify the triggered policies among
which to allocate.
The second, and most helpful
guideline in this case, is that when there is a continuing
injury that “arises from discrete and identifiable events,
then the actual injury trigger theory allows those policies
on the risk at the point of initial contamination to pay for
all property damage that follows.” In other words, the
issue of allocation should be raised only if the triggering
injury does not “arise [ ] from discrete and identifiable
82
events.”
In applying the rule of Domtar, the In re Silicone court then
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 414-15.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 417-22.
Id.
Id. at 420 (citation omitted).
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articulated a two-step approach to claims of injury which do “not
83
arise [ ] from discrete and identifiable events.”
First, we determine whether the plaintiffs’ injuries are
continuous. If they are not, under the actual-injury
trigger theory, the policies on the risk at the time of the
injury would pay all losses arising from that injury. Here,
the court found that the injuries are continuous, so we
move to the next determination: whether the continuous
injury arose from some discrete and identifiable event. If
it does, the policies on the risk at the time of that event
are liable for all sums arising from the event. If not,
84
allocation may be appropriate.
The In re Silicone decision then concludes:
In our actual-injury trigger framework, allocation is meant
to be the exception and not the rule because “[i]t is only
in those difficult cases” that allocation is appropriate.
Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 733. If we can identify a discrete
originating event that allows us to avoid allocation, we
85
should do so.
Thus, notwithstanding Domtar’s suggestion that NSP was the
correct rule and SCSC the exception, In re Silicone clarifies that
SCSC, and now In re Silicone, are the rule. NSP and Domtar are the
exceptions. The court suggests that NSP and Domtar are applicable
only in cases, like gradual environmental contamination cases, in
which an insurable event or events recurring over multiple years
gives rise to a continuing injury.
Viewed in the context of NSP, SCSC, Domtar, and In re Silicone,
it is now clear that the “time on the risk” allocation rule was not the
focus of dispute in any case since NSP. Rather, what courts have
struggled with is how to apply Minnesota’s “actual injury” trigger
rule. The punch line of allocation flows from the straight man’s
set-up. If policies from multiple years are triggered, “time on the
risk” allocation will apply (absent contrary evidence assigning loss
to particular periods). However, if only one policy year is
triggered, there is nothing to allocate.
III. ATTORNEY FEES
In re Silicone also addressed the issue of attorney fees, less
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 421-22.
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confusing but nonetheless significant. 3M sought to recover its
attorney fees incurred in defending against its insurer’s declaratory
86
judgment action and prosecuting its counterclaims.
Existing
Minnesota law provides that a successful policyholder may recover
attorney fees incurred in a coverage battle if the insurer has refused
to provide a defense, or seeks a declaration of no duty to defend,
whether it was the policyholder or the insurer that first brought the
87
coverage suit. Here, however, 3M sought fees under policies that
did not obligate 3M’s insurers to defend 3M, but instead required
88
them to reimburse 3M’s defense costs.
The supreme court
refused to extend the attorney fees rule to that situation,
explaining:
3M asserts that in both cases the insured contracts to
avoid the burdensome expense of litigation only to have
litigation thrust upon it by the insurer in a coverage
action. We disagree . . . . As the insurers argue, if an
insurer breaches its duty to defend, the insured must do
twice what it contracted to avoid: hire attorneys and
manage a lawsuit for both the underlying case and the
declaratory judgment proceeding.
In contrast, the agreement to reimburse the insured for
defense costs by its high-level, excess insurance providers
does not involve the promise to relieve the insured from
the burdens of litigation . . . . An agreement to reimburse
the insured’s defense costs is simply an agreement for the
payment of money. Attorney fees are not recoverable in
declaratory judgment actions to establish that the insurer
89
must pay the insured money.
In terms of precedent, the supreme court’s decision is
unremarkable. The court’s reasoning, however, is subject to
challenge on the ground that there is no articulated basis for
treating a breach of a contractual obligation to do something other
than pay money differently from a breach of a contractual
obligation to pay money. This is particularly true because insurers
that owe a defense are not deemed in breach of that duty if they
86. Id. at 422.
87. Id.; see also Morrison v. Swenson, 142 N.W.2d 640 (Minn. 1966) (holding
that where an insurer denies liability and a declaratory action is brought, the
alleged insured, if successful, is entitled to recover legal fees caused by the
insurer’s breach of contract).
88. In re Silicone, 667 N.W.2d at 424.
89. Id. at 425.
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reserve their right to disclaim coverage and allow or require the
policyholder to defend herself, while reimbursing the policyholder
90
for her costs incurred in doing so.
However, the most fundamental problem with the court’s
holding regarding attorney fees is that the court missed an
opportunity to reconcile two competing views of an insurer’s
obligations to its policyholder. While In re Silicone treated 3M’s
insurers’ obligations as merely contractual (and treated a
contractual obligation to defend as different in kind from a
contractual obligation to pay defense costs), other Minnesota
decisions have previously acknowledged that an insurer’s policy
91
obligations are not merely contractual. Rather, once coverage is
triggered, the insurer becomes a fiduciary and will be held
92
responsible for acting in the best interests of its insured.
United States District Court Judge Ann Montgomery of the
District of Minnesota has recently sought to reconcile that
dichotomy by concluding that an insurer’s fiduciary duties and
good faith obligations arise only once an insurer accepts control of
the settlement of claims, which, in turn, arises only upon that
93
insurer’s acceptance of its duty to defend. Thus, under Miller,
3M’s duty to reimburse defense costs, rather than defend directly,
would not likely give rise to any fiduciary or good faith duties by the
94
insurer.
However, an insurer may owe duties to settle, or to
contribute toward a settlement, even absent a duty to defend,
especially under a “defense cost reimbursement” policy. In any
event, it is an issue that would have benefited from clarification by
the Minnesota Supreme Court.
IV. ELECTRONIC DATA AS TANGIBLE PROPERTY
In Sprint Spectrum, the supreme court decided a fairly narrow
95
sales tax case. In doing so, however, it affirmed and strengthened
90. Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1979).
91. Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384 (Minn. 1983); Kissoondath v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Northfield Ins.
Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 545 N.W.2d 57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
92. Short, 334 N.W.2d at 387.
93. Miller v. ACE USA, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1140-41, 91 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1521 (D. Minn. 2003).
94. Indeed, under one reading of Miller, an insurer could avoid its fiduciary
responsibility by breaching its duty to defend, giving the insurer a significant
incentive to breach its defense obligations. See id.
95. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 676 N.W.2d 656, 658
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a growing body of Minnesota law recognizing electronic data as
96
(insured) tangible property.
Some background is useful in interpreting Sprint Spectrum.
While numerous courts have recently addressed whether electronic
data is tangible property, including under CGL and property
policies, Minnesota has addressed the issue, as the saying goes,
“early and often.” As such, it has one of the most developed bodies
of law on the issue. That law breaks down into tax cases and
coverage cases.
A. Minnesota Tax Law Cases
One line of “tangible property” cases has arisen under
Minnesota’s tax statute, which itself has been amended over time.
The line begins in 1977, when the supreme court decided Fingerhut
97
Products Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue.
In that case, Fingerhut
sought to avoid taxation by claiming that its mailing lists were not
“tangible personal property” under section 297A.14 of the
98
Minnesota Statutes. The supreme court found that the use of the
names and addresses on the lists was not a taxable use of tangible
property, since what was being used was the information on the list,
and the form of the communication of the data was irrelevant or
99
incidental to Fingerhut’s use.
However, the supreme court
further found that when Fingerhut purchased mailing labels with
preprinted names and addresses, the use of mailing labels was use
of tangible property, since the physical form of the information was
100
a part of its value.
Legislative changes set the stage for subsequent cases. In 1984,
the Minnesota Legislature exempted purchases of “capital
equipment” from a portion of Minnesota’s sales tax, and in 1989
101
this became a full exemption. Section 297A.01, subdivision 16(a)
originally defined capital equipment as “machinery and equipment
. . . used by the purchaser or lessee for manufacturing, fabricating,
(Minn. 2004).
96. See id. at 665; Zip Sort, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 567 N.W.2d 34, 40
(Minn. 1997); Fingerhut Prods. Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606, 610
(Minn. 1977).
97. 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977).
98. Id. at 608; see MINN. STAT. § 297A.14 (1971) (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 297A.63, subd. 2 (2004)).
99. Fingerhut, 258 N.W.2d at 610.
100. Id.; see MINN. STAT. §§ 297A.14, 297.14 (1989) (amended 2000).
101. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 658-59.
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102

mining, quarrying, or refining a product to be sold at retail.” In
103
One change was to replace “a
1993, the statute was amended.
product” in the text quoted above with “tangible personal
104
property.”
In Minnesota RSA 10 Ltd. Partnership v. Commissioner of
105
Revenue, the pre-1993 version of the statute was found applicable
to the purchase of cellular telephone system equipment, which
“does not merely deliver communications, but also ‘creates the
106
signal required to transmit voice or data.’”
As such, RSA 10’s
telephone equipment was deemed to have been used to
107
manufacture, fabricate or refine a “product.”
However, in an
earlier decision in that case (the decision in which the 1993
“tangible personal property” version of the statute was deemed
inapplicable), the tax court concluded that “[t]he words ‘product’
and ‘tangible personal property’ are not synonymous . . . . RSA 10 .
. . agrees that the [e]quipment is not used to manufacture tangible
108
personal property.”
The tax court was affirmed without opinion
109
by an equally divided supreme court.
However, in 1997, the supreme court itself analyzed the 1993
legislative changes in Northern States Power Co. v. Commissioner of
110
Revenue. NSP was seeking to avoid sales taxation on transformers,
which the Commissioner of Revenue contended were used to
111
produce electricity, an “intangible” product. The supreme court
disagreed, noting that it had ruled electricity a “product” under the
pre-1993 statute and determining by reference to legislative history
that no narrowing of the prior 1993 exception was intended by the
112
1993 amendments.
Also in 1997, the supreme court decided Zip Sort, Inc. v.
102. MINN. STAT. § 297A.01, subd. 16(a) (1992).
103. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 659.
104. Act of May 24, 1993, ch. 375, art. 9, § 25, subd. 16, 1993 Minn. Laws 2728,
2897 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 297A.01, subd. 16(a) (Supp. 1993)).
105. No. 6481, 1997 WL 410997 (Minn. T.C. July 18, 1997), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 581 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1998).
106. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 661 (quoting RSA 10, 1997 WL
410997, at *3).
107. RSA 10, 1997 WL 410997, at *2-3.
108. Minn. RSA 10 Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 6481, 1996 WL
53858, at *3 (Minn. T.C. Feb. 6, 1996).
109. Minn. RSA 10 Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r of Revenue, 581 N.W.2d 36 (Minn.
1998).
110. 571 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1997).
111. Id. at 575.
112. Id. at 575-76.
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113

Commissioner of Revenue, another sales tax case. In this case, the
supreme court concluded that bar codes added to mail constituted
tangible property under the amended version of Minnesota
114
Statutes section 297A.01, subdivision 16(a).
In addressing
whether the bar codes constituted tangible property, this time the
supreme court did not rely on legislative history but instead
conducted an analysis of the nature of tangible property. First, it
noted the statutory definition of “tangible personal property” as
115
“corporeal personal property of any kind.” The court also noted
that Black’s Law Dictionary “defines ‘corporeal property’ as ‘all
things which may be perceived by any of the bodily senses . . .
although a common definition of the word includes merely that
116
which can be touched and seen.’”
The court concluded,
however, that “the statutory language is not all that helpful,” and
117
instead turned to its 1977 Fingerhut decision for guidance.
Ultimately, the Zip Sort court concluded that the bar code was
tangible personal property because the consumer was buying “more
than the information contained in the bar code, it [was] paying for a
118
particular ‘form’ of this information.”
Then, in 2001, the tax court decided Qwest Corp. v.
119
Commissioner of Revenue.
In Qwest, the tax court concluded that
the 1993 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 287A.01,
subdivision 16(a) did narrow the exemption, based on the court’s
reading of the meaning of “product” as contrasted with “tangible
personal property” (and citing the first tax court order in RSA
120
“Tangible personal property,” in turn, was defined in
10).
Minnesota Statutes section 297A.01, subdivision 11, as “corporeal
121
personal property of any kind.”
The Qwest tax court therefore
turned to Black’s Law Dictionary for a definition of “corporeal:”
Such as affects the senses, and may be seen and handled,
as opposed to incorporeal property, which cannot be seen
113. 567 N.W.2d 34 (Minn. 1997).
114. Id. at 40.
115. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 297A.01, subd. 11 (1996).
116. Zip Sort, 567 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 343 (6th ed.
1990)).
117. Id.
118. Id. (emphasis in original).
119. Nos. 7214-R, 7283-R, 2001 WL 355861 (Minn. T.C. April 2, 2001), aff’d by
an evenly divided court, 640 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. 2002), abrogated by Sprint Spectrum,
L.P. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 676 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2004).
120. Id. at *3-4.
121. Id. at *2.
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or handled . . . . In modern law, all things which may be
perceived by any of the bodily senses are termed
corporeal, although a common definition of the word
122
includes merely that which can be touched and seen.
It also cited Black’s definition of tangible property: “property
that has physical form and substance and is not intangible. That
which may be felt or touched and is necessarily corporeal, although
123
it may be real or personal.”
Declaring that Minnesota Statutes
section 645.08, subdivision 1, requires one to assign “common and
approved” usage to statutory language, the Qwest tax court adopted
the “common definition” of corporeal and concluded that
124
telephone service was not “tangible personal property.”
The supreme court review involved only four justices, who split
2-2, resulting in an affirmance, without opinion, by an equally
125
divided court.
B. Minnesota Insurance Coverage Cases
Minnesota’s foray into the physical nature of electronic data
for purposes of insurance coverage arguably began with Magnetic
126
Although the
Data, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
Minnesota Supreme Court in Magnetic Data technically declined to
address the issue of whether the erasure of data constituted
127
damage to “tangible” property, that case has been read by some
as suggesting that data constitutes intangible, uninsured,
128
property. In Magnetic Data, the insured mistakenly erased data on
129
computer disk cartridges it had been asked to inspect.
In
determining that there was no coverage, the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated in dicta: “[W]e find that the intent to limit coverage to
loss of use of tangible property remains. Therefore, absent clear
language to the contrary, we decline to interpret this CGL policy to

122. Id. at *2-3 (quoting BLACK’S, supra note 116).
123. Id. (quoting BLACK’S, supra note 116, at 1456).
124. Id.
125. Qwest Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 640 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. 2002).
126. 442 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 1989).
127. Id. at 156.
128. See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Physical Losses in Cyberspace, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 55,
63 n.37 (2002) (summarizing Magnetic Data as “suggesting but not determining
that under a CGL policy, accidental erasure of data from client's disk does not
constitute loss of use of tangible property”).
129. Id. at 154.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/4

20

Thavis: Drawing the Lines More Brightly: The Minnesota Supreme Court Clar
THAVIS (CB & CKI & LSK).DOC

2004]

11/14/2004 4:20:27 PM

DRAWING THE LINES MORE BRIGHTLY

471
130

extend coverage to loss of use of intangible property.” The court
then proceeded, however, to specifically decline to decide whether
131
data constituted tangible or intangible property.
Rather, the
court reasoned it did not have to decide the issue because (i) if the
data was intangible, there was no “property damage” and so the loss
was not covered; and (ii) if it the data was tangible property, then
the claim was excluded under the “care, custody and control”
132
exclusion.
Two years later, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the
133
issue in Retail Systems, Inc. v. CNA Insurance Cos. and found that
both computer tape, and the data on that tape, were tangible
134
property.
In doing so, it noted that Magnetic Data did not reach
135
the issue and also distinguished Fingerhut on the grounds that “it
[is] inappropriate to apply tax law to the interpretation of an
insurance policy.
Moreover, Fingerhut did not consider the
tangibility of computer tapes or data. Finally . . . sales tax law . . .
has since been amended to state that this material is tangible
136
property for tax purposes.”
Finally, the Retail Systems court found that other jurisdictions
were split on whether “recorded material is tangible property for
137
tax purposes.” After noting that Minnesota’s statute appeared to
parallel the smaller number of decisions from states finding that
138
recorded material was tangible property, the court nonetheless
declared that “we have considered whether these tax precedents
should govern an insurance case and conclude that they should
139
not.”
While undoubtedly correct, this statement did not appear
to end citation of tax cases by coverage counsel.
However, shortly thereafter, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
held that misappropriation of proprietary information did not
constitute “property damage” under a CGL policy because the
140
information was not deemed “tangible.”
In that case, the court
130. Id. at 156.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 469 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
134. Id. at 738.
135. Id. at 737.
136. Id. at 738 n.1.
137. Id. at 737.
138. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 297A.01, subd. 11 (1990)).
139. Id. at 738.
140. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 490 N.W.2d
626, 631 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
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relied on the American Heritage Dictionary definition of “tangible”
as: “1.a. Discernible by the touch; capable of being touched;
palpable. b. Capable of being treated as fact; real; concrete; tangible
141
evidence.”
The court concluded that the proprietary information
142
was not tangible because it was not capable of being touched.
Although less than directly on point, it is worth noting that the
Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Sentinel Management Co. v. New
143
Hampshire Insurance Co., found “direct physical loss” from the
presence of asbestos in a building because its presence affected the
144
building’s function.
In 2001, the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
relying heavily on Sentinel Management, decided General Mills, Inc. v.
145
In General Mills, food was sprayed with a
Gold Medal Insurance Co.
cheaper, unapproved version of a substance chemically
indistinguishable from the name-brand product that the FDA
146
required be used.
Even if food was chemically identical to what it
was supposed to be and is “not dangerous for human consumption,”
the “FDA treats the presence of an unapproved chemical as an illegal
147
adulteration of food products” and deems the food unusable. The
court of appeals concluded that the unusable food was “physically
damaged” by virtue of its inability to be used for its intended
148
purpose.
C. Insurance Coverage Cases From Other Jurisdictions
While a few other states addressed the insurable nature of
electronic data prior to 2000, it is primarily since that date that
courts have begun to directly address whether damage to such data
constitutes “direct physical damage or loss.” In American Guarantee
149
& Liability Insurance Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc. the federal district
court in Arizona concluded that data loss, including loss of use, did
constitute “direct physical damage or loss,” but did so primarily on
a public policy basis, rather than an interpretation of existing law

141. Id. at 631 (emphasis in original) (quoting AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1242
(2d Coll. Ed. 1982)).
142. Id.
143. 563 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
144. Id. at 300-01.
145. 622 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
146. Id. at 150.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 152.
149. No. 99-185, 2000 WL 726789 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2000).
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150

or policy language.
The next major decision, America Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury
151
Insurance Co., rejected Ingram Micro, albeit in deciding coverage
under a CGL policy, which references “physical damage to tangible
152
153
property,” not “direct physical loss or damage.”
Notwithstanding America Online, the Court of Appeals of New
Mexico found coverage under a CGL policy for loss of data
154
destroyed on a computer hard drive.
Then, in Lambrecht &
155
Associates, Inc. v. State Farm Lloyds, the Texas Court of Appeals
found that the physical loss from the corporate policyholder’s
computer system malfunction, the result of a hacker’s virus,
156
required the replacement of the entire system.
157
In Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Professional Data Services, Inc., the
policyholder’s customer filed suit, alleging loss of use of software
158
and lost or corrupted patient account data incorporated therein.
The Cincinnati Insurance court concluded that such data was not
tangible property and that therefore, there was no coverage for the
policyholder defendant under the property damage clause of its
159
CGL policy.
In Ward General Insurance Services, Inc. v. Employers Fire Insurance
160
Co., the policyholder’s data was deleted during an upgrade to the
161
The policyholder sought firstpolicyholder’s computer systems.
party coverage for the cost of recovering the data and for the
162
business interruption loss.
The California Court of Appeals,
163
citing Seagate Technology, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
and America Online, held that because the operative terms “physical
loss” and “tangible property” were undefined in the policy, the
normal meaning of those words should be examined and that
150. Id. at *2-4.
151. 207 F. Supp. 2d 459 (E.D. Va. 2002).
152. Id. at 462.
153. Id. at 469-70. But see Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121
F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1274 n.18 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
154. Computer Corner, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 46 P.3d 1264 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2002).
155. 119 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. App. 2003).
156. Id. at 27.
157. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15859 (D. Kan. July 18, 2003).
158. Id. at *8.
159. Id. at *18-22.
160. 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
161. Id. at 846.
162. Id.
163. 11 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
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“physical” meant having a material existence perceptible to the
senses and that “tangible” meant capable of being perceived,
164
Utilizing those definitions, the
especially by the sense of touch.
Court concluded that a database was not physical since it did not
165
have a material existence.
D. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Commissioner of Revenue
These developments helped add significance to the Minnesota
166
In Sprint
Supreme Court’s 2004 Sprint Spectrum decision.
Spectrum, the question before the court was whether sales tax was
due on capital equipment purchased by Sprint, which provides
167
telephone service.
Sprint argued that its purchase of equipment
for its telephone service, like the purchase of equipment in Zip Sort,
qualified for the tax exemption for capital used in manufacturing
168
“tangible personal property.”
The government contended that
Sprint provided a telephone service, and thus did not manufacture
169
tangible personal property. In a lengthy opinion, with an equally
lengthy dissent, the court concluded that “[i]f the medium in
which the information resides is merely incidental to the reason for
the purchase, the transferred information is intangible property.
But if the medium in which the information resides is essential or
necessary to the reason for the purchase, then the transferred
170
information is tangible property.”
On that basis, the court
determined that the telecommunications equipment qualified for
171
the tax break.
172
The facts of Sprint Spectrum were established by stipulation.
The three appellants (collectively “relators”) provided different
aspects of telephone services, including local, wireless, and long173
distance telephone service.
All three appellants purchased
equipment for their businesses and challenged the applicability of

164. Ward, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 851-52.
165. Id.
166. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 676 N.W.2d 656 (Minn.
2004).
167. Id. at 657.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 658.
170. Id. at 663 (citing Zip Sort, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 567 N.W.2d 34, 40
(Minn. 1997)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 657.
173. Id.
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174

sales tax on those purchases. The relators argued that they were
eligible for a sales tax exemption on the equipment because the
purchased equipment was “capital equipment” used in
175
manufacturing “tangible personal property.”
“Tangible personal
property,” in turn, is defined as “corporeal personal property of any
kind whatsoever, including property which is to become real
property as a result of incorporation, attachment, or installation
176
following its acquisition.”
The supreme court concluded that equipment used in
providing telephone communications services to customers
constituted capital equipment under the statutory definition, which
177
included the definition of “tangible personal property.” In doing
so, it relied heavily on its 1997 decisions in Zip Sort and NSP, in
which it had ruled that bar codes and electricity were tangible
personal property, and hence mail coding machines and electrical
transformers were capital equipment that qualified for the sales tax
178
As the Sprint Spectrum Court concluded in its
exemption.
discussion of NSP:
As with electricity, telecommunications is corporeal
personal property “of any kind whatsoever” and includes
all things which may be perceived by any of the bodily
senses, including, but not limited to, touch, sight, hearing
and, in this case, can be precisely measured, directed and
delivered for use by a retail customer. Our traditional
analysis and precedent would categorize this
telecommunications
equipment
as
refining
or
manufacturing a product “to be sold ultimately at
179
retail.”
The Sprint Spectrum court buttressed its statutory interpretation
argument by again examining the legislative history of the statute
in question and reaffirming that the 1993 legislative amendment to
the statute, substituting “tangible personal property” in place of the
earlier language “a product,” intended no narrowing of the tax
180
exemption.
174. Id.
175. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 297A.01, subd. 16(a) (2000).
176. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 659 (citing MINN. STAT. § 297A.01,
subd. 11 (2000) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 297A.61, subd. 10 (2002)).
177. Id. at 665.
178. Id. at 662-64.
179. Id. at 664; see also N. States Power Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 571 N.W.2d
573, 576 (Minn. 1997).
180. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 664-65.
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Finally, the Sprint Spectrum court abrogated Qwest, the earlier
tax court decision that provided the basis for much of the tax court
decision in Sprint Spectrum. “Relying on a previous tax court
decision, [Qwest], the tax court noted that ‘the common definition
of ‘corporeal’ ‘does not include a product that can only be heard
181
In particular, the supreme court
and not touched or seen.’”
concluded that the tax court holding in Qwest “directly
contradicted our holding in NSP” that the legislature intended no
182
narrowing of the exception by its amendment.
The Qwest tax court decision was itself based in large part on
Black’s Law Dictionary 1990 edition’s definition of “tangible
property” as “that which may be felt or touched[,] and is necessarily
183
corporeal.”
Thus, the Sprint Spectrum court also reviewed, but
rejected, the argument advanced by the tax court (and by Justice
Anderson in his dissent) that the requirement that the personal
property be “corporeal” “does not include a product that can only
184
be heard and not touched or seen . . . .”
Indeed, Justice
Anderson nonetheless argued that the supreme court improperly
rejected Black’s 1994 definition of “corporeal property,” which
provides:
Such as affects the senses, and may been seen and
handled, as opposed to incorporeal property, which
cannot be seen or handled, and exists only in
contemplation . . . . In Roman law, the distinction
between things corporeal and incorporeal rested on the
sense of touch; tangible objects only were considered
corporeal. In modern law, all things which may be
perceived by any of the bodily senses are termed
corporeal, although a common definition of the word includes
185
merely that which can be touched and seen.
In response, the supreme court entered into an extended
discussion of various dictionary definitions of “corporeal” and

181. Id. at 658 (citing Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Comm’r of Revenue, Nos. 7299-R,
7308-R, and 7309-R, 2003 WL 21246600, at *5 (Minn. T.C. May 23, 2003) (quoting
Qwest Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, Nos. 7214-R and 7283-R, 2001 WL 355861, at
*3 (Minn. T.C. Apr. 2, 2001), abrogated by 676 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2004)).
182. Id. at 661 (citing N. States Power Co., 571 N.W.2d at 575).
183. Id. at 660-61.
184. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 2003 WL 21246600, at *5 (quoting Qwest, 2001 WL
355861, at *3).
185. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 667 (emphasis in original) (quoting
BLACK’S, supra note 116, at 343).
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186

“tangible property.”
It noted, for example, that the Black’s Law
Dictionary definition had changed since the 1994 edition: “the
1999 [Seventh] edition of Black’s revised the definition of
187
‘corporeal property’ to ‘property that can be perceived.’”
The
Sprint Spectrum court then concluded: “While dictionary definitions
are sometimes helpful in statutory interpretations, it would expand
the power of a dictionary’s author for this court to rely solely on a
portion of a specific dictionary text, or to overemphasize single
188
words or examples within a specific dictionary entry.” Finally, the
Sprint Spectrum Court noted while it referenced Black’s in Zip Sort, it
did not rely on it but instead relied on Fingerhut in reaching its
189
decision.
In short, the supreme court has wisely chosen not to bind itself
to particular dictionary definitions but rather has clarified, albeit in
a tax context, that “tangible property” will typically include
electronic property such as telephone and electrical transmissions.
That is good news for policyholders seeking coverage for electronic
data loss.

186. Id. at 662.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 663. Of course, the one area in which tax law and insurance law do
differ is that while the courts have looked to the “common” definition of a term in
construing statutory language in insurance coverage, law terms undefined in the
policy should be construed narrowly in favor of coverage. Compare Nadeau v.
Austin Mut. Ins. Co., 350 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1984) (“[T]he terms of a statute
generally should be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning.”)
with Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 179
(Minn. 1990) (“If the terms of an insurance policy are not specifically defined,
they must be given their plain, ordinary and popular meaning . . . [but]
[a]mbiguous terms in an insurance policy are to be resolved against the insurer
and in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”).
189. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 663.
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